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The rise of rights talk is a subject that has gripped academia in recent
years. Many historians of modem America are now searching for the
origins of the rights revolution and the feverish use of rights arguments on
the left and on the right. Two recent works of legal history tackle one part
of this question with trailblazing interpretations, focusing on left-wing
rights discourse and the successes of the civil rights movement. Both
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books offer compelling and well-written narratives of post-war legal
issues, and they present innovative arguments that this revolution began in
response to global crises.1 Richard Primus's The American Language of
Rights argues that rights are not natural truths, but are, rather, historically
contingent. Rights, he claims, evolve when a political community reacts to
particular adversities and synthesizes established rights with new
conceptions of rights to combat that adversity.2 Just as the Founding and
Reconstruction generations articulated systems of rights in response to
particular events and evils, the post-World War II generation pursued a
vision of human rights defined against the horrors of Nazi and Stalinist
totalitarianism. In a parallel story, Mary Dudziak's Cold War Civil Rights
attributes America's advances in desegregation to a global public relations
crisis over the treatment of blacks.' As this international embarrassment
provided ample fodder for Communist propaganda, presidents from
Truman to Johnson heeded a "Cold War imperative" to promote racial
justice.
Grappling with the complicated origins of the civil rights movement and
the Warren Court's activism, Primus and Dudziak offer coherent
explanations that integrate domestic politics, international events, and the
world of ideas. By placing this rights revolution so clearly in their global
post-war context, they have pushed the boundaries of the legal academy to
a more global perspective, and they have contributed to our understanding
of the civil rights movement's broader origins. They have also suggested
how seemingly unrelated events force leaders to embrace social reform,
and how those leaders build on rights traditions to gain momentum. Even
as legal academics continue to argue that rights are fundamental and
universal, Primus and Dudziak offer evidence that rights are historically
constructed, contextually reactive, and ad hoc.
However, both books emphasize the role of elites,4 and for that matter,
of left-leaning elites, which leads to two shared shortcomings. This
emphasis enables them to make some particularly insightful observations
about the decisions of many significant political leaders, judges, and
academics from the 1940s to the 1960s. This perspective creates a great
story, but unfortunately, it is only half the story, or more accurately, one
quarter of the story. As a result, they overlook some very significant
1. Both Primus and Dudziak have expanded their arguments from previously published law
review articles. Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61
(1988); Richard Primus, A Brooding Ominpresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional
Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423 (1996).
2. RICHARD PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 64-65 (1999).
3. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS (2000).
4. Jack Rakove and Elizabeth Beaumont have also offered this critique of Primus's book. See Jack
Rakove and Elizabeth Beaumont, Rights Talk in the Past Tense, 15 STAN. L. REv. 1865, 1891-94
(2000) (reviewing PRIMUS, supra note 2). This Book Note echoes and builds upon those questions,
and then extends this critique to Primus's overlooking the rights counter-revolution by conservatives.
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differing perspectives on the Cold War and rights discourse.
The first shortcoming is that this perspective does not address perhaps
the most significant aspects of this era: the rise of popular rights
consciousness and the decisive role played by marginalized social groups
that embraced liberal rights talk.5 Second, the focus on liberal elites
obscures two of the most important explanations for the demise of
American liberalism: first, the conservative popular revolt against liberal
elites; and second, the successful rights counterattack by conservatives.
Turning the tables on the New Deal coalition's populism, conservatives
recast themselves as defenders of the people's rights against a liberal
elite.6 Conservatives with different interests and backgrounds were able to
coalesce around rights rhetoric, libertarianism, and anti-totalitarian Cold
War themes to form the ascendant Republican majority.7 Primus ignores
this backlash, which developed equally significant languages of rights in
response to totalitarianism. Dudziak does a better job of noting the limits
of her study, of identifying the role of non-elites, and of recognizing the
eventual backlash. Part of the reason she devotes less attention to how the
Cold War undermined civil rights is that this story is the conventional
wisdom that she questions so effectively.
This Book Note seeks to extend their insights about the significance of
global politics and rights discourse even further, in order to grasp the
dynamics of the rights counter-revolution. This conservative response was
equally context-driven, globally minded, and anti-totalitarian. Other
historians, fleshing out the story with other groups and other rights talk,
reveal that this era was less a rights "revolution" with one language
prevailing, -than a rights "evolution" with multiple vocabularies
developing from traditional languages of rights. When Primus's and
Dudziak's books are synthesized with this historical scholarship, a rich
and complicated story of rights revolutions and counter-revolutions
emerges.
5. See TAYLOR BRANCH, THE PARTING OF THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-
1963 (1988); JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI
(1994); CHARLES M. PAYNE, I'VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION AND
THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE (1995); JAMES PATERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE
UNITED STATES, 1945-1974 (1995).
6. Jonathan Rieder, The Rise of the Silent Majority, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL
ORDER 243 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) (tracing the rise of reactionary populism from
the 1950s to its triumph in 1968).
7. See NUMAN BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE SOUTH
DURING THE 1950's (1969); DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE
ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1995);
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I. RIGHTS TALK
A. A Language of Rights
Richard Primus introduces his book with a tale that has become
canonical in legal scholarship8 :
Clifford Geertz tells a now-famous story about being confronted by a
man who denied the reigning scientific understanding of planetary
orbits, insisting that the earth is in fact borne aloft on the back of an
elephant. The elephant, he said, was standing on a turtle. When
pressed as to what supported the turtle, he replied that it was another
turtle; in fact, he explained, it was "turtles all the way down."9
This last line from this tale returns as the title of the final section of
Primus's conclusion ("Turtles All the Way Down"), making the turtle
theory a satire of natural rights theory. While this anecdote may be
overused in the legal academy, it is still an appropriate choice for Primus's
project. He comments that rights "are not rights all the way down," and
that "perhaps... there is no bottom to stand upon," but he is also careful
not to dismiss the importance of rights. Formalist rights theory may be
flawed, but the "substantive rhetorical power" of rights in American
culture means that rights arguments cannot be dismissed, for rights indeed
stand for something meaningful in cultural practice. As Primus concludes,
"What I hope this study has established is the practice-dependent nature of
rights and the historical contours of the relevant practice. That rights exist
means that someone has established as normative that some substantive
commitment is important and should be protected.""°
Primus discovers the historical contours of American rights discourse in
a pattern of adversity, reaction, and synthesis, which Primus calls
8. Jeanne Schroder offers the following commentary on the "turtles all the way down," and
suggests that the story predates Geertz:
I cringe to refer to the unending terrapin tower because it is fast becoming a banal clichd of
infinite regress . . . . However, it never fails to make me giggle. Roger Cramton traces the
anecdote back to William James (using rocks, the more amusing turtles apparently added by
later rewriters who knew a little about Hindu mythology). Roger C. Cramton, Demystifying
Legal Scholarship, 75 GEO. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1986); see also WILLIAM JAMES, THE WILL TO BELIEVE
AND OTHER ESSAYS IN POPULAR PHILOSOPHY 104 (1956). Despite this, the story continues to
have a life of its own, appearing in two general forms. In one, the anecdote poses as the
cosmological myth of some foreign or ancient people. ... The other versions are variations of
the James anecdote. Sometimes the story is presented as an actual encounter with a real scientist.
I have no idea whether the anecdote actually originated with James. It is such a good story,
that I suspect that it has been around in one version or another for a long time.
Jeanne L. Schroder, Law and the Post-Modern Mind: The Vestal and the Fasces, 16 CARDOZO L. REV.
805, 812 n.28 (1995). Schroder cites twelve articles mentioning this tale, and a database search on
Lexis lists thirty-four articles with the phrase "turtles all the way down."
9. See PRIMUS, supra note 2, at 8-9, citing CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 28-29 (1973).
10. Id. at 246-47.
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"concrete negation." During the Founding, Reconstruction, and post-
World War II eras, Americans encountered adversity and evils, reacted to
them with reforms, and synthesized their historical experiences, building a
new political vocabulary upon the old. As a result, new understandings of
rights emerged by a process of negation and reflection. Primus suggests
that rights exist "neither of form nor of content but of function, having to
do with how claims of rights are used and understood within the
discourses of law and politics."'" Accordingly, he formulates a notion of
rights not as "final resting places," but as evolving context-based
"waystations and placeholders."'
Pursuing this relatively broad cultural history of rights discourse,
Primus states that his book is a "middle-level account" of both political
and academic discourse-a political history, rather than an intellectual or
social history. 3 Primus at one point states that his "focus throughout is on
elites,"' 4 but he also establishes from the outset that he seeks to cast a
wider net to capture a cultural practice.
In his second chapter, Primus responds to the work on historical
"transformations" of Akhil Amar, who has heralded Reconstruction as the
pivotal rights transformation, 5 and of Bruce Ackerman, who has raised
the New Deal to the level of the Founding and Reconstruction.' 6 Primus
builds on their insights and contends that they have missed a fundamental
rights revolution: the anti-totalitarian moment of the mid-twentieth
century. '
7
Primus's treatment of the Founding and Reconstruction illuminates his
thesis about concrete negation. 8  While some scholars attribute a
11. Id. at 45.
12. Id. at 44.
13. Id. at 53-55. See infra text accompanying notes 51-55 for a discussion of Primus's historical
focus.
14. Id. at 74. See also id. at 129.
15. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).
16. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998).
17. Amar emphasizes the revolutionary role of the Fourteenth Amendment in incorporating the
Bill of Rights, but Primus insightfully notes that the battle over incorporation took place not in the
1860s, but rather from the 1940s to the 1960s-in the context of anti-totalitarianism. Ackerman, in his
theory of constitutional politics and higher lawmaking, posits that the New Deal was a constitutional
revolution that gave shape to our current legal structure and led to the rights revolution in the 1950s
and 1960s. But again, Primus challenges this view, because this rights revolution generally
disregarded economic justice, and instead emphasized "rights against racial discrimination, abusive
police practices, censorship, and government regulation of personal privacy. Those issues correspond
more closely to the threats of Nazism and Soviet communism than to the problems of the Great
Depression and the New Deal." PRIMUS, supra note 2, at 71. Furthermore, he notes that the New Deal
court embraced judicial restraint, while the Warren Court prevailed through judicial activism-a shift
not only of means, but also of basic values. Thus Primus has set a foundation for his truly innovative
argument: World War 11 and the Cold War produced a legal transformation on par with the Founding
and Reconstruction, and fundamentally shaped the modem language of rights.
18. PRIMUS, supra note 2, at 7.
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theoretical unity of individualism to the Constitution's framers,19 Primus
demonstrates that the framers also embraced collectivist and institutional
concepts of rights. He suggests that this seeming inconsistency in fact
reveals an underlying consistency: The framers were more context-driven
and outcome-based than concerned with theoretical uniformity. They
formulated rights ad hoc in reaction to particular British abuses of military
intrusion, criminal procedure, trade restriction, and religious
establishment. 2' Reconstruction was similarly shaped by historical context.
Rather than merely expanding the rights established at the Founding, the
Republicans responded to particular threats of the "Slave Power
Conspiracy" with new understandings of rights. While legal scholars have
tried to interpret Reconstruction's tripartite division of civil, political, and
social rights as a coherent system, Primus reveals that the Republicans
merely played a shell game with the categories, shifting claims back and
forth depending on political support for particular claims.
Primus argues persuasively about the Founding and Reconstruction, but
the most original section is his third episode, exploring the Warren Court's
rights revolution and the revival of natural law. This chapter navigates not
only a broad range of groundbreaking Supreme Court cases; it also
elucidates some of the most important legal philosophy of this century.
During the 1930s, the New Deal discredited loose "natural law"
jurisprudence, which had become the questionable theoretical foundation
for the Supreme Court's laissez-faire judicial activism in striking down
state and federal economic regulation. In the place of natural rights theory,
the New Deal academy embraced "positive law," which found the source
of law's legitimacy not in universal abstract rights, but in the will of the
people and the democratic rule of the state. However, mass-movement
totalitarianism cast a dark cloud on the legitimacy of pure popular will and
the state. After World War II, there were three major shifts from the New
Deal transformation: from economic rights to non-economic civil rights
and civil liberties; from positive law to natural law (or foundationalism);
and from judicial restraint to judicial activism. Primus attributes these
changes to the influential concept of anti-totalitarianism.
21
After witnessing the terrifying abuse of state power and "positive law"
by Hitler and Stalin, the legal academy turned to universal "foundational"
theories of rights. The academy began attacking ideas by suggesting that
they could lead to Nazism, a fallacy that Leo Strauss coined as "reductio
19. Primus cites Michael Sandel for labeling the Founders' conception of rights as unhealthily
"individualist." Id. at 87.
20. Id. at 84-126.
21. Jed Rubenfeld has argued that the right of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut and subsequent
cases was founded not on a theory of "personhood," but on a Foucauldian theory of anti-
totalitarianism. While his article has been tremendously influential, it is theoretical, and not historical.
Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737 (1989).
[Vol. 13:2
6
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol13/iss2/6
Shugerman
ad Hitlerum." After ignoring natural law theory for over a decade, legal
academics moved away from positive law and revived natural law in a
burst of articles. Building on pre-existing notions of rights, Americans
created a new vocabulary of universal human rights: "[C]ertain rights exist
and must be respected regardless of the positive law."22  While some
writers asserted that the concept of "human rights" was really a
reformulation of the Enlightenment's "natural rights of man," Primus
argues that the Enlightenment thinkers' term included only European men,
whereas these new rights theorists were addressing all people, especially
minorities.
Primus notes that during the war, racism was not the obvious evil of the
Nazis. The Roosevelt administration emphasized that the chief evil of the
Nazis was their policy of aggressive warfare. The American prosecution at
the Nuremberg Trials, now memorialized for their convictions for "crimes
against humanity," actually focused on Nazi military aggression, rather
than the Holocaust. However, with World War II as a cultural mirror, the
American people over time began to see Nazi Germany as a reflection of
their own worst shortcomings-namely, racism.23 Americans revised their
understanding of the Nuremberg trials and of the war in general to capture
the ideal of anti-racism.
In Primus's account, the Supreme Court adopted an anti-totalitarian
consciousness during and after the war. Initially, Nazism served as a
powerful lesson to the Supreme Court about state power and minority
rights. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette in 1943, the
Court overturned state requirements that school children salute the
American flag (a salute which, according to community groups cited by
the court, looked "too much like Hitler's" salute).24 Justice Jackson
rejected such coerced conformity as comparable to the "Siberian exiles as
a means to Russian unity, [and] to the fast failing efforts of our present
totalitarian enemies."25 From Barnette, the Court turned to protecting
racial minorities. Having upheld the Japanese internment in Hirabayashi
v. United States26 and Korematsu v. United States,27 the Court eventually
condemned the internment in Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo28 in December 1944.
This repudiation of the internment may have been too little, too late, but it
established the persecution of the Japanese Americans as a negative
precedent, and it marked a momentous turn toward protecting racial
minorities. Then, turning to discrimination and quasi-state action, the
22. PRIMUS, supra note 2, at 178.
23. Id. at 187.
24. Id. at 199.
25. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1943).
26. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
27. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
28. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
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Court struck down all-white primaries 29 in 1944 and racially restrictive
covenants30 in 1948. Primus locates the reasoning of Brown v. Board of
Education3 in this line of thinking, especially in Justice Frankfurter's
departure from his commitment to judicial restraint and textualism.
The Soviets served as another negative model for this rights revolution.
At first, the Court was complicit in McCarthyism, 32 but after Warren took
the helm, the Court began to define America against the oppressive
Stalinist regime33 and to protect civil liberties34 and criminal defendants'
rights.35 Primus then shifts back to the Nazis to explain the academic turn
from positivism to universal rights and the Court's recognition of
"emanating penumbras" and an unenumerated right to privacy.36 Up to this
point, Primus's study of anti-totalitarianism focuses almost exclusively on
the Supreme Court, with a few national politicians mixed in.
Ascending into the rarefied air of academic discourse, Primus concludes
his chapter with the Lon Fuller-H.L.A. Hart debate over positivism, and
the more recent theories of Richard Posner, Bruce Ackerman, John Rawls,
Cass Sunstein, and Ronald Dworkin. There is an ironic twist to Primus's
historicist treatment of the anti-historicist natural law theorists. In 1949,
Leo Strauss pointed out the paradox of World War II: The United States
had won the military battle, but lost the cultural war. Somehow Germany
had succeeded in imposing on America "the yoke of its own thought,"
historicism, which undermined the natural rights foundation of American
democracy.37 On the one hand, Primus's solid evidence of the revival of
natural law thinking refutes Strauss's observation, and he adds a twist to
Strauss's concern by demonstrating that the return of universal rights was
in fact a reaction to the Nazis. On the other hand, Primus's ardent
historicist approach to rights theory ultimately validates Strauss's fears.
And worst of all for Strauss, Primus's historicist account of American law
and jurisprudence is very persuasive.
29. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
30. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I (1948).
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
32. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
33. Here Primus also recognizes Dudziak's work on the Court's response to Cold War in the
realm of civil rights, though he distinguishes her pattern of reaction from his. PRIMUS, supra note 2, at
212 n.88 (citing Dudziak, supra note 1).
34. PRIMUS, supra note 2, at 209 (citing MORTON HORWrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 260 (1993) for the argument that 1957 was the Court's turning point in protecting
civil liberties).
35. The initial expansion of Fourth Amendment protections occurred very soon after World War
II. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The
Court then significantly extended defendants' rights in the early 1960s. See Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Primus might have added Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 836 (1966), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
36. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
37. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY 1-2 (1949).
[Vol. 13:2
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B. A Cold War Imperative
When most Americans consider the Cold War's effects on domestic
political life, the first things that come to mind are McCarthyism and red-
baiting. Conservatives around the country-from J. Edgar Hoover to
southern White Citizens' Councils-used anti-communism to block the
civil rights movement and undercut organized labor.38 Against this
conventional wisdom, Dudziak reveals a contrary trend: The Cold War
created a foreign policy imperative to improve the United States' image
abroad by ending segregation. Marshalling an impressive amount of
evidence from the Soviet Union, Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America,
Dudziak shows that America's racial segregation and violence provided
potent material for Soviet propaganda and imperiled potential Cold War
alliances. As the Cold War was beginning to unfold, President Truman's
advisors, diplomats, and Congressional leaders emphasized the
significance of civil rights on the world stage.39 Dudziak then traces the
beginning of the propaganda battles between the United States
government celebrating the democratic process and its incremental steps
toward desegregation, and prominent African Americans who gave the
world a far more critical assessment of American democracy.
From this point, Dudziak takes the reader on a tour of the civil rights
accomplishments of each administration from Truman to Johnson, and she
convincingly links them to the "Cold War imperative." In 1947, Truman's
Committee on Civil Rights called for racial justice on foreign relations
grounds: "[W]e cannot escape the fact that our civil rights record has been
an issue in world politics. The world's press and radio are full of it....
[Communist countries] have tried to prove our democracy an empty fraud,
and our nation a consistent oppressor of underprivileged people. 4 °
Looking toward the 1948 election, Truman desegregated the military and
created a Fair Employment Board, and then campaigned on this
imperative: "Today the democratic way of life is being challenged all over
the world. Democracy's answer to the challenge of totalitarianism is its
promise of equal rights and equal opportunities for all mankind.,
41
Truman's Justice Department cited the foreign policy damage of racial
discrimination in amicus briefs in four prominent racial discrimination
38. See, e.g., TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1963-1965
(1998); ALAN DRAPER, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN THE SOUTH (1994); MICHAEL HONEY, SOUTHERN LABOR AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS
(1993); GERALD HORNE, BLACK AND RED: W.E.B. DuBois AND THE AFRO-AMERICAN RESPONSE TO
THE COLD WAR (1986); ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: McCARTHYISM IN AMERICA
390-91 (1998); SUGRUE, supra note 7, at 209-231; ROBERT H. ZEIGER, AMERICAN WORKERS,
AMERICAN UNIONS, 1920-1985 (1994).
39. DUDZLAK, supra note 3, at 29, 33, 35, 39, 43, 45.
40. Id. at 80.
41. Id. at 87.
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cases, and won each case.4 2 The Truman Justice Department then decided
to -participate in the consolidated school segregation cases, Brown and
Bolling v. Sharpe.43 Its amicus brief included lengthy passages about the
Cold War imperative of desegregation, including this closing quotation
from the President himself: "If we wish to inspire the world whose
freedom is in jeopardy, if we wish to restore hope to those who have
already lost their civil liberties, if we wish to fulfill the promise that is
ours, we must correct the remaining imperfections in our practice of
democracy."" When the Court decided Brown and Bolling, the American
propaganda machine kicked into high gear, and the world responded
enthusiastically. While most Southerners opposed the ruling, those
Southerners who endorsed it explained that it was necessary for improved
Cold War public relations.45
Eisenhower's appointment of Chief Justice Earl Warren was the key to
the 9-0 Brown decision, but Eisenhower himself was no believer in civil
rights. As Warren recalled, Eisenhower told the Chief Justice as Brown
was pending that Southern opponents of integration were "not bad people.
All they are concerned about is to see that their sweet little girls are not
required to sit alongside some big overgrown Negroes. ' '46 However,
Eisenhower's support for desegregation in spite of these prejudices is
perhaps the most convincing evidence of the Cold War imperative. In
1957, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus used state troops in Little Rock to
defend white supremacy against the rule of law, and foreign observers
compared the American South to Nazi Germany.47 Eisenhower was very
reluctant to intervene, but, as he put it, "the eyes of the world" forced him
to enforce the law with federal troops.48 Dudziak then documents the
importance of international praise for the desegregation cases and their
enforcement.
President Kennedy had more personal affinity for civil rights than
Eisenhower did, but he, too, hesitated in the face of southern opposition.
However, popular protests against Jim Crow in the early 1960s met with
massive violent resistance, changing the political landscape and again
drawing global attention. Following a series of embarrassing events in
Alabama, Kennedy unequivocally committed himself to strong civil rights
42. Id. at 91-93. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), prohibited the judicial enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950), ruled that segregated
railroad dining hall cars violated the Interstate Commerce Act. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950),
and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), desegregated a
graduate school and a law school, respectively.
43. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
44. DUDZIAK, supra note 3, at 101-02.
45. Id. at 111.
46. Id. at 130.
47. Id. at 125.
48. Id. at 133.
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legislation on national television in June 1963, and he invoked the Cold
War as a crucial reason for fighting racism. As powerful evidence for
Dudziak's thesis, both Eisenhower and Kennedy shied away from
promoting civil rights until international scrutiny forced them to act.
Kennedy's proposed Civil Rights Act of 1963 would have created an
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, increased protection for
voting rights, denied federal funding to discriminatory programs, and
prohibited discrimination in public accommodations. Polls indicated that
Americans endorsed Kennedy's civil rights proposals because they would
improve America's image abroad and rob the Soviets of their most
powerful propaganda. Kennedy's assassination and Lyndon Johnson's
moral leadership galvanized support for the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which swept through the House, 290 to 130, and then overcame a three-
month Senate filibuster to pass with a similar supermajority, 73 to 27.
Dudziak concludes with Johnson's Great Society, which seemed to be
the crowning achievement for Cold War civil rights, but by 1968, the
Vietnam War unraveled the Great Society. Soon after Johnson signed the
Civil Rights Act, he sought political cover from conservative critics by
escalating the Vietnam conflict with the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Just as
the Cold War had mandated an expansion of civil rights, the battle for civil
rights mandated an expansion of the Cold War. Unfortunately, this
strategy backfired on Johnson's civil rights agenda, as Vietnam shattered
the civil rights coalition and overshadowed the social justice agenda. This
political shift reversed the "Cold War Civil Rights" pattern to create what
I would call a "Civil Rights Cold War"-a disastrous linkage of domestic
and foreign strategies.
Dudziak observes that the Cold War imperative became more limited
after well-publicized court rulings and legislative reforms eliminated the
most glaring injustices. Once the world congratulated America for ending
de jure segregation, and once the world focused on other crises (such as
Vietnam), the Cold War imperative ceased to be a sufficiently powerful
force. One example is how the South so easily replaced formal school
segregation, which had drawn so much international criticism, with less
obvious bureaucratic methods that successfully impeded integration.4 9
This limitation on the Cold War's influence helps explain why American
schools are still segregated defacto.
49. Id. at 149-50.
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II. GRASSROOTS AND BACKLASH
A. Recognizing Reaction and Limitation
Dudziak and Primus present models of historical change that emphasize
reaction and negation. In Primus's account, American elites developed an
anti-totalitarian principle by recognizing evils abroad, identifying aspects
of those evils at home, and negating them with a context-driven
vocabulary of rights. Dudziak's model is in some ways a mirror image:
Other countries recognize an evil in America, then Americans identify this
image problem as a foreign policy crisis, and oppose this evil with
context-driven rhetoric addressed to those foreign observers.
Primus and Dudziak, both legal academics, generally fixate on
particular elites: liberal academics, left-leaning judges, presidents,
diplomats, and federal officials. Their insights about reaction and negation
should be applied to other groups: radical grassroots, conservative elites,
and reactionary political movements, as they constructed different
languages of rights and Cold War imperatives from the same set of
historical circumstances.
At one point in his analysis, Primus embraces a broad sociological
vision of rights talk by suggesting that rights are defined by "how people
use the terms 'rights,"' and thus he adopts an anthropological/historical
approach that "look[s] to rights discourse as a social practice."5 Primus
indeed explores the particular uses of rights rhetoric, but emphasizes the
discourse of intellectuals and national leaders, and not a broad social
practice. If turtles represent history, Primus weaves compelling narrative
of the rights revolution from a particular set of turtles on the top end of the
pile, but he leaves out the turtles below, and in particular, he leaves out the
50. PRIMUS, supra note 2, at 26. Early on, Primus offers a sound objection to Rawls's "reflective
equilibrium" (a term reflecting the way theory and practice respond to one another). According to
Rawls, one can identify a set of specific rights outcomes in practice, then create general principles
about rights, and later expand or revise that principle when new desirable or undesirable rights
outcomes emerge over time. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 48-50 (1971). Perhaps as a rebuttal,
Primus argues that reflective equilibrium is circular, premised upon consensus about what specific
outcomes are in fact desirable, when no such consensus may exist. Some moderate rights historicists
like Thomas Haskell, seeking a theoretical middle ground between historicism and universalism, have
cited Rawls's articulation of reflective equilibrium as historically oriented and organically developing.
Thomas L. Haskell, The Curious Persistence of Rights Talk in the "Age of Interpretation," 74 J. AM.
HIST. 984 (1987). Haskell suggests that historicism and critical legal studies may go too far in
undercutting the validity of rights discourse. Building from a surprising and innovative interpretation
of Hume and Rawls, he seeks a balance in this contested "border territory between Reason and
History" with the conception of rights as "rational conventions." Id. at 1009. He recalls Hume's
emphasis upon "social custom and common sense," and then cites Rawls's "Kantian constructivism,"
a belief that rights should be "congruen[t] with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our
aspirations,.., given our history and our traditions imbedded in our public life." Id. at 1008.
According to this rights theory of rational conventions, rights discourse should reflect "the
(conventional) practices of a community's form of life." Id. at 1002. Interestingly, Haskell features
Geertz's anecdote about "turtles all the way down," just as Primus does. Id. at 991.
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"elephant" of the anecdote: the Republican party and its own reactionary
rights rhetoric.
It is rare for a scholar to have such a tremendous grasp of both history
and philosophy, and Primus does a masterful job of explaining these
events and ideas, as well as developing his own analysis. With his
argument about anti-totalitarianism, Primus stands tall on the shoulders of
other constitutional scholars and makes a very important contribution to
legal history and constitutional theory. However, he fails to achieve his
stated goals of writing a "middle-level account" of political, legal, and
academic discourse." His initial notion of "middle level" appears to be
political history somewhere in between intellectual history and social
history. He states, "It is not my intention to write a 'a history from below'
of American rights: indeed, my analysis concentrates on the most
powerful members of society."5 At the same time, Primus concurs with
Cornel West's critique of scholars who "emphasize intellectuals and
exclude politics."53 He then criticizes West for not following through:
"Ironically, West largely fails to heed his own advice... West advocates
political and heterogeneous analysis, but seems to have settled for
intellectual history."54 In a footnote, he repeats this criticism, chiding West
for making his plea for diverse perspectives in a book that "is not only
intellectual history, but elite intellectual history."55
These comments are rather curious, because Primus also fails to heed
his own advice and his criticism of West. Primus's chapters on the
Founding and Reconstruction examine few voices outside the
Constitutional Convention and the Reconstruction Congress, and as such,
they are clearly not heterogeneous and multileveled political histories.
Later, his chapter on totalitarianism reaches even higher into the ethereal
realm of intellectual history, focusing almost entirely on Supreme Court
justices and academics. Primus's book is middle-level only if "high level"
is the study of the development of ideas with no attention to historical
context. However, as intellectual history has become more and more the
study of ideas in their historical contexts, this depiction of "high level" lies
somewhere between the disciplines of history and philosophy, while
Primus's purported middle level is exactly the kind of elite intellectual
history that he himself criticizes. Furthermore, Primus aspires to articulate
the "American language" of rights as a cultural practice, but he succeeds
mostly in depicting an academic and jurisprudential language of rights.
While he invites histories "from below," he does not address the nuances
51. PRIMUS, supra note 2, at 54-55.
52. Id. at 54; see also id. at 74, 129.
53. Id. at 53.
54. Id. at 53-54.
55. Id. at 54 n.19.
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of political cultures, and he overlooks contrary forms of rights talk.
Dudziak is more cognizant of the limitations and nuances of her thesis.
She introduces her argument with an appropriate caveat: "In spite of the
repression of the Cold War era, civil rights reform was in part a product of
the Cold War."56 Dudziak often recognizes that other factors shaped the
civil rights movement, and that the Cold War was simultaneously "an
agent of repression and an agent of change."57 While the struggle with
Communism opened doors for racial justice, it also required the
government "to contain and manage the story of race," to the exclusion of
more controversial narratives.58 When the civil rights movement
demanded broader social changes in the late 1960s, a weary public
accepted Nixon's anti-rights campaign of law and order.59 At times, she
seems to suggest that there were two phases of its influence: before and
after Vietnam became a full-scale war. She generally suggests that the
Cold War was a pro-civil rights influence until 1968,60 and that the
Vietnam War was the main reason for the reversal. While she clearly is
aware that the Cold War also undermined the civil rights movement before
1968, her account might have made that influence more explicit.
B. The Role of the Grassroots and the Public
The focus on elites, particularly liberal ones, obscures some important
perspectives on the rights revolution. First, this approach underemphasizes
one of the most intriguing aspects of the civil rights era: the particularly
significant role of liberal grassroots protest in focusing national attention
on civil rights reform. While historians and the public have often
identified the civil rights movement with the mobilized student protest in
the mid-1960s, more recently historians have emphasized the dramatic
spread of rights consciousness in the general public and more
marginalized groups, predating the 1960s student protests. Whereas
Primus suggests that right-consciousness originated with elites, James
Patterson's comprehensive work on the post-war era attributes the
upheaval of the 1960s to the ever-increasing hopes and expectations
among America's various social groups during World War II, and to the
post-war social, demographic, and economic changes.6 While Patterson
emphasizes the role of the NAACP and the courts in later years, he also
56. DUDZIAK, supra note 3, at 13 (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 250.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 248.
60. Dudziak's most prominent example of foreign policy constraining civil rights progress in the
1950s and early '60s was the State Department's crack down on prominent black leaders and their
ability to travel. However, this emphasis overlooks the role of the Cold War in the broader political
shift against civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s.
61. PATTERSON, supra note 5, at 384-85.
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emphasizes the role of the grassroots: "The Reverend [Martin Luther
King] he didn't stir us up," one young Montgomery woman told a reporter
at the time. "We've been stirred up a mighty long time.
6 2
Other historians trace black activism and rights claims back even earlier.
Glenda Gilmore demonstrates that black rights consciousness emerged in
the late nineteenth century.63 As blacks claimed more status and more
political power in southern society, middle-class whites anxiously fought
back with segregation and disenfranchisement. This repression did not
snuff out black rights claims, as middle class black women grabbed the
torch and continued the fight in the early twentieth century. Robin D.G.
Kelley reveals a radical world of black communism in 1930s Alabama,
which laid a foundation for the civil rights struggles decades later.64 Risa
Goluboff, John Dittmer, and Charles M. Payne illustrate that a powerful
rights consciousness had emerged in the southern black community in the
mid-1940s, which served as a necessary foundation for the civil rights
mobilization in later years.
65
Thomas Sugrue's study of post-war Detroit shows that rights
consciousness spread among northern blacks at the same time, growing
out of their experiences during the New Deal and from the war. According
to Sugrue, black Detroit residents embraced the New Deal notions of
economic rights after the war, and tried to co-opt rights rhetoric to defend
their interests. "Subsidized loans and mortgage guarantees, promised by
New Deal legislation, became a fundamental right.... [Whites] came to
expect a vigilant government to protect their segregated neighborhoods.
These constituents of the New Deal state reinterpreted the government's
rhetoric of homeownership to their own ends."66 The work of these
historians suggests that many minority groups identified with rights
rhetoric mostly because of personal lived experience before and during the
war, rather than from a concept of anti-totalitarianism.
Scholars have recently engaged in a vibrant debate about whether the
civil rights revolution was triggered by elites (i.e., the Supreme Court
justices and national politicians), by organized advocates and grassroots
activists (the NAACP, the SCLC, and student protesters), and/or by
popular consensus. Consensus is an increasingly common explanation.
Michael Klarman argues that Brown and subsequent court orders produced
62. Id. at 401.
63. GLENDA E. GILMORE, GENDER AND JIM CROW (1996). One could also trace black rights
consciousness back even earlier.
64. ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, HAMMER AND HOE: ALABAMA COMMUNISTS DURING THE GREAT
DEPRESSION (1990)
65. DIT-rMER, supra note 5, 1-40; PAYNE, supra note 5, at 7-102; Risa Goluboff, "Won't You
Please Help Me Get My Son Home ": Peonage, Patronage and Protest in the World War II Urban
South, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 777 (1999).
66. SUGRUE, supra note 7, at 62.
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change not by their direct impact, but indirectly, by provoking a series of
backlashes.67 After the major integration rulings of the 1950s, schools still
remained overwhelmingly segregated. Klarman contends that Brown's
most significant role was its provoking extreme Southern resistance and
violence, which shook the North out of complacency about civil rights and
mobilized a national consensus against Jim Crow. As a result, the Civil
Rights Act and Voting Rights Act passed with broad majorities.
Klarman's interpretation refutes the naYve, lawyerly view of top-down
change from the courts, and emphasizes the importance of broad
democratic change.
Mark Tushnet contends that the Warren Court was actually cautious and
moderate until 1962, and then turned to the left because of two Kennedy
appointments, Justices Byron White and Arthur Goldberg. 68 Dudziak's
thesis about global scrutiny suggests that this shift was not just about
Court personnel, but also about an emerging national consensus reacting
to southern violence. Complementing Dudziak's argument, Lucas Powe
suggests that the Court's liberal decisions resulted not merely from new
appointments, but from the influence of a national consensus emerging
around race and rights. Powe's perspective refutes the notion that the
Supreme Court's judicial review was counter-majoritarian, and indeed, he
suggests that it was surprisingly consensus-oriented.69
Throughout American history, wars have promoted national unity and
an apparent consensus about values and goals, and both Primus and
Dudziak contribute a lot to this linkage of war and rights. Americans have
often framed their wars as struggles to defend rights, leading to an
expansion of those rights domestically. A crucial element of these
expansions was the broad social pressures of war and the ability of
excluded groups to mobilize politically and militarily. It was too difficult
to recruit soldiers from lower classes and racial minorities if they were
denied political rights and inclusion in the national community. These
social groups capitalized on the need for popular support by demanding
political rights. Alexander Keyssar specifies an example of this bottom-up
social pressure during World War II, when blacks demanded, "Prove to us
that you are not hypocrites when you say this is a war for freedom." The
protests of soldiers provided a different angle on the struggle against
totalitarianism, at home and abroad.
70
67. Michael Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM.
HIST. 81 (1994).
68. Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 7 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993).
69. LUCAS POWE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000).
70. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES, at xxi (2000). Keyssar shows how the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the
Mexican-American War, the Civil War, World War I, World War H, the Cold War, and Vietnam
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Primus's attention to elites allows him to write a remarkably insightful
and focused analysis, but without the public or even mid-level leaders, he
falls short of completing his ambitious project. In contrast, Dudziak does
a better job of recognizing the role of advocates, grassroots, and the
public. She regularly acknowledges the NAACP and other advocates for
their role in promoting the Cold War imperative, and she occasionally
cites polling data.71 She also attributes much of Truman's embrace of civil
rights to the demands of black voters in 1948,72 and Kennedy's similar
shift to the dramatic rise of grassroots mobilization and student protest in
the early 1960s.73  Skillfully integrating the national narrative with
dramatic local stories, Dudziak offers poignant anecdotes of the civil
rights crisis. For example, she retells the story of a young African-
American boy who, "when asked by his teacher what punishment he
would impose upon Adolph Hitler, said: 'I would paint his face black and
send him to America immediately!"' 7 4 While Dudziak emphasizes how
political leaders established the rhetoric, she deserves a lot of credit for
demonstrating how the Cold War rhetoric resonated with the public and
mobilized political action. Her book is a more multi-leveled study, and is a
better model for what Primus calls "middle-level" history.
C. An Opposing Cold War Imperative
The Cold War may have sensitized Americans to the appearance of
racial strife, but even beyond the problem of McCarthyism, anti-
communism stirred fears about increasing federal government power,
created a conservative ideological front, and sharply redirected the
language of rights. Distinguishing his study of rights from Ackerman's
New Deal transformation argument, Primus notes that while the New Deal
established economic changes and judicial restraint, the post-war rights
revolution was distinctly non-economic and revived judicial activism.
75
Primus is correct to emphasize this difference and link it to anti-
totalitarianism, but he does not ask a second-level question: Why were the
post-war rights so distinctly non-economic? Or more accurately, why were
the post-war economic rights so distinctly conservative (e.g., laissez faire,
property rights, and free contract rights)? He recognizes McCarthyism as
a problem, but he emphasizes its rejection in the mid-1950s and concludes
that anti-Stalinism ultimately led to judicial breakthroughs in civil
liberties. However, labor historians and civil rights historians have
contributed to the expansion of voting rights.
71. DUDZIAK, supra note 3, at 187.
72. Id. at 23-25.
73. Id. at 157-59.
74. Id. at 36.
75. PRIMUS, supra note 2, at 71, 181.
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illustrated how anti-communism still succeeded outside the walls of the
Supreme Court, undermining attempts to address class and race issues
throughout the country.76 Certainly, anti-totalitarianism highlighted
particular rights, and led to their protection, but it also labeled other rights
claims as threats to order, tradition, and national security.
Primus focuses specifically on the rise of "human rights" as the core
term in post-war rights language. In America, this term developed a
distinctly negative-liberty connotation (a freedom from state action, such
as racial discrimination, police state abuses, and invasions of privacy),
while at the same time, "human rights" in the United Nations and around
the world also meant positive liberty (entitlements to state action, like
food, shelter, clothing, and subsistence). Racial justice meant
desegregation, but not full de facto integration. The Great Society
advanced some class and economic rights, but anti-communism limited
and ultimately eroded the welfare state. Primus's anti-totalitarianism led
to the right to privacy and sexual freedom, but only for heterosexuals.
According to Elaine Tyler May, the Cold War politically and culturally
legitimated homophobia and the repression of homosexuals.77 May also
points out that ostensibly "private" family life became more confining,
more conservative, and more public as a cultural extension of the Cold
War. Primus contends that the right to privacy, in Griswold v. Connecticut
(1965), involving birth control and Planned Parenthood, arose out of the
Cold War anti-totalitarian ideal. However, in a poignant example, May
points to the fact that the "Birth Control Federation of America" changed
their name in 1942 to Planned Parenthood Federation of America as part
of a shift from a rhetoric of rights to a more conservative, family-oriented
image. May cites an article in 1954: "Most of all, [Planned Parenthood]
gave the birth control movement 'a clean image,' emphasizing not
women's rights, individual freedom, or sexuality, but, as Scientific
American noted, 'the need for individual couples to plan their families and
nations to plan their populations."'7 8 This is hardly the language of rights
and privacy. It is the repressive rhetoric of national Cold War policy.
These political impulses limiting America's language of rights created a
different Cold War imperative, as Cold War anti-civil rights. Dudziak
acknowledges the limits of her thesis, as I have noted before,79 that the
Cold War was only a partial explanation for racial advances, and it was
also "an agent of repression."80 Repression was part of the imperative to
carefully manage and control the public story of race. At the same time,
76. See works cited supra note 7.
77. ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BoUND 82-84 (2d ed. 1999).
78. Id. at 132-33.
79. DUDZIAK, supra note 3, at 250.
80. See supra text accompanying note 56-58.
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the Cold War's repression could also be attributed to a countervailing
"Cold War imperative" about economic, social policy, and social control.
Dudziak suggests that Americans grew impatient with the civil rights
movement's plea for economic equality because of free market principles,
which were deeply ingrained in American history:
Class differences had never been something the nation felt the need
to apologize for. Instead, capitalism, which assumed an inequality of
wealth and power, was championed as an economic system that
would best promote economic growth. Class based inequality did not
threaten the nation's core principles. The U.S. Constitution did not
address the issue.
81
This may have been true for Cold War America, but class was a hotly
contested issue during the Jacksonian Era, the Populist-Progressive Era,
and the Great Depression. In fact, for most of the 160 years before World
War 1I, Americans were far more troubled by class inequality than racial
inequality. A majority believed that segregation did not threaten the
nation's core principles, and that the Constitution did not explicitly
address this issue, either. Similarly, the U.S. Constitution also did not
explicitly address privacy or abortion. Yet somehow these issues found
constitutional protection during the Cold War, while economic rights did
not.
While traditional free market leanings surely played a role in frustrating
class equality, a major factor was a socially conservative Cold War
imperative, in which conservatives engaged in an ideological public
relations battle with the Communists over traditions and economic
systems.82 After World War 11, conservative intellectuals could be
separated into three strains, which ultimately converged and prevailed in
the late 1960s: the libertarians, the traditionalists, and the hard-line anti-
communists. Before the war, the libertarians and free marketers had been
thoroughly marginalized by the popularity of the New Deal, but as the
Cold War unfolded in the late 1940s, they took advantage of a new
nemesis and a much more favorable political climate. Communism gave
conservatives an opportunity to frighen the public, to revive arguments for
free enterprise, and to attack New Deal bureaucracy and the labor
movement. These intellectuals presented the nation and the world with
ideological arguments that unfettered capitalism was the only true path,
and that all statist systems opened the door to totalitarian control. While
few mainstream politicians adopted this extreme position in the 1950s and
1960s, the conservative ideology bolstered the opponents of labor, civil
81. DUDZIAK, supra note 3, at 243.
82. See generally GEORGE H. NASH, THE CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN
AMERICA SINCE 1945, especially at 127 (1976).
2001] 549
19
Shugerman: Rights Revolutions and Counter- Revolutions
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2001
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
rights, and economic redistribution. Just as the civil rights imperative
created a need to "manage" race by promoting civil rights while
restraining too much dissent, the imperative of social and economic
ideology may also have contributed to the Great Society, as proof to the
world of welfare capitalism. Nevertheless, the emphasis of this imperative
was to rally around the capitalist system and celebrate the free market.
Another group of intellectuals, the traditionalists, followed a Cold War
imperative relating to cultural norms. They attributed the rise of
totalitarianism and Stalinism to the decline of traditional institutions and
morality, and the rise of mass society without values. Borrowing from
Edmund Burke, they argued at home and abroad for preserving religious
traditions and social order, and they fought to make America an example
of social stability for the world. These perspectives on the free market and
traditionalism were strong currents in Cold War politics, and eventually,
they were an integral part of the Nixon victory in 1968 and the end of the
civil rights era.
Dudziak's project questions the conventional wisdom that the Cold War
was fundamentally an impediment to civil rights, so she understandably
sets those questions aside in order to focus on her own innovative
argument. But once those questions about conservative backlash are
reintroduced, her insights can be extended and may lead to an intriguing
synthesis. The conventional wisdom is that the Cold War created an
atmosphere hostile to social change and civil rights, and Dudziak counters
with an argument that the Cold War's international scrutiny created a
period of national self-reflection, self-criticism, and a redefining of goals
and rights. A synthesis suggests that conservatives fit into both dynamics:
in response to Nazism and Stalinism, and fearful of radical change at
home, American conservatives did more than engage in red-baiting
McCarthyism. They also generated a powerful rights-based ideology as
part of a Cold War ideological struggle, for both an international audience
and a domestic constituency. In the context of the Cold War, the American
public gravitated to that ideology of laissez-faire capitalism. Americans
engaged in a process of self-definition that embraced formalist civil rights
along with capitalism and federalism. This moderate-to-conservative
vision of rights prevented a more sweeping movement for equality, and it
fed the backlash against it.
D. An Opposing Language of Rights
Primus offers a convincing account of the rights framework of liberal
elites, but other groups countered with their own rights rhetoric. In
addition to promoting an alternative Cold War imperative, the three
branches of conservative intellectuals spoke their own language of rights,
often in rebuttal to the liberals, and often in strongly anti-totalitarian
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terms. In particular, the libertarians, such as the World War II refugee
Friedrich A. Hayek, created a dissenting rights discourse celebrating
contract rights and property rights in particular, in opposition to statism,
economic regulation, and desegregation. Barry Goldwater's speech,
"extremism in defense of liberty is no vice," was an anthem of
conservative rights discourse. Not surprisingly, the libertarians regularly
linked the New Deal with Stalinism, and used anti-totalitarian imagery
even more explicitly than Primus's liberals.
The traditionalists, the second branch, hailed the freedom of religion
and defended a religiously-oriented system of natural rights against a
relativist and totalitarian threat. They believed that a failure to promote the
value of each individual led to "totalitarian messianic democracy," which
treated individuals only as a means to misguided social ends. A
conservative, divinely-based system of natural rights would save America
from ideologies out of control, such as New Deal liberalism.83 In the midst
of World War II, Russell Kirk, the most prominent traditionalist
intellectual, praised the established Jeffersonian freedoms of local self
government, private property, civil liberties, and economic self-reliance.84
This appeal for Jeffersonian freedoms served the libertarian agenda, the
traditionalist agenda, and also as a critique of totalitarianism. Though the
anti-communists' commitment to individual rights was more tenuous, they
gravitated to both of these critiques, and generated rights-oriented
propaganda by attacking Stalinism's police state abuses.
In one of the most glaring contrasts to Primus's account, William F.
Buckley, one of the traditionalists, called for a crackdown on Martin
Luther King and the non-violent civil rights protests with a shocking twist
on rights discourse and anti-totalitarianism: "Repression ... is an
unpleasant instrument, but is absolutely necessary for civilizations that
believe in order and human rights. I wish to God Hitler and Lenin had
been repressed."85 Primus regards the concept of "human rights" as the
hallmark of anti-repression, anti-racist rights language, but Buckley
demonstrated with stunning clarity how rights talk can be appropriated for
opposing purposes. Curiously, Buckley's lesson from the totalitarians was
that the state needed to repress more, not less, to promote human rights.
Non-elites also fought the rights counter-revolution by appropriating
anti-totalitarianism and rights. Southern "neo-Bourbons" in the 1950s
mobilized violent opposition to integration with rights discourse of their
own. They resurrected the states' rights doctrine of "interposition" from
the antebellum era to reject federal extension of power. The neo-Bourbons
harnessed resentment against New Deal bureaucracy and unionization, and
83. Id. at 54.




Shugerman: Rights Revolutions and Counter- Revolutions
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2001
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
they filled their attacks with cries of totalitarianism. One Bourbon leader
announced:
I consider the Citizens' Council movement the beginnings of a
fundamental conservative revolt throughout the country. Much more
is involved than the school segregation issue. Many of our
membership is [sic] concerned also about the trend toward the
welfare state, the drift toward totalitarianism, the dangers of the
United Nations. The integration issue is merely an entering wedge.
The movement to integrate schools is part of the liberal trend that
should be stopped. 6
The Dixiecrat platform complained: "The national Democratic Party...
denounced totalitarianism abroad but unblushingly proposed and approved
it at home."87 The Bourbons were also surprisingly vocal in their
opposition to the "police state"-as they identified it with centralized
power enforcing integration-and perhaps with police protection of blacks
from racist obstruction and terrorism.88 Moreover, they embraced rights
discourse in calling for laissez faire economics and evading integration
orders with "freedom of choice" plans.
89
Reactionaries were able to appropriate rights rhetoric to cover their
racist agenda with a fagade of legal and moral legitimacy. This rhetoric
enabled the bourbons to unify parts of the South against integration. Their
unified front collapsed after racist violence alienated southern moderates,
but eventually moderates shifted back to the right. In the 1960s, George
Wallace and other extremist leaders re-unified southern resistance under
the rhetoric of anti-totalitarianism and rights, until the Republicans co-
opted their message. Wallace, who ran for the Democratic presidential
nomination in 1964 and as the States' Rights nominee in 1968,
emphasized "freedom of choice," property rights, and the "preservation of
individual freedom," and framed these rights against totalitarianism. 9°
With a platform linking states' rights and hard-line anti-communism,
Wallace hovered between twenty percent and twenty-five percent in
national polls in the 1968 race. Wallace was greeted by rousing support in
many midwestern cities, such as Milwaukee and Flint, Michigan. One
journalist reflected on what Wallace was thinking as he campaigned in the
North: "They all hate black people, all of them. They're all afraid, all of
them. Great God! That's it! They're all Southern! The whole United
States is Southern!" 91 Nixon realized that he had to tap into Wallace's
86. BARTLEY, supra note 7, at 251.
87. Id. at 33.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 135.
90. CARTER, supra note 7, at 262, 346, 294.
91. Id. at 344.
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base to win, especially as Humphrey regained support in the last month of
the campaign. Nixon shifted against desegregation and Brown, and then
announced his support for anti-integration "freedom of choice" school
plans.92 Nixon siphoned off Wallace's voters, and Wallace won just
fourteen percent of the national vote and fifty-eight electoral votes.
Nevertheless, Wallace was still able to win eight percent of the vote
outside the Old South, a reflection of the North's increasing sympathy
with southern resistance.
Rather than embracing the rights of minorities and the disempowered,
white homeowners in the North shattered the interracial New Deal
coalition and framed their opposition to racial justice with their own rights
rhetoric. Thomas Sugrue explains that white homeowners were simply
reappropriating the rights talk that had empowered other groups after the
war. 3 Rights talk was equal opportunity, so to speak, in a manner far more
widespread and more hostile to human rights than Primus suggests.
Rather than being chastened by the racist evil of the Nazis, some in the
homeowners rights movement called for the establishment of a "National
Association for the Advancement of White People" and spoke openly of
white supremacy. 94 Later, anti-communism framed the attack against the
left. Believing that the civil rights movement was closely linked with
communist conspiracies, white homeowners declared war against the
integrationists. The Michigan Real Estate Association contended that a
law banning discrimination in real estate would "ROB the individual of his
'property rights' which are truly inseparable from human rights."95 Other
anti-integrationists declared, "THIS IS YOUR PERSONAL WAR TO SAVE
YOUR PROPERTY RIGHTS," and "HELP CRUSH DICTATOR RULE."'9 6 A
"Vigilantes Organizational Meeting" declared, "Help Stamp Out
Oppression-Fight for Our Rights."97 The homeowner rights movement
also prevailed in California, Ohio, and various cities around the North and
West-Aemonstrating the Southernization of American politics. Sugrue
links this homeowners movement to mob violence and vigilante attacks
against blacks, which increased in the 1960s. With the hot rhetoric of
rights and war, homeowners associations whipped up mobs against the
black "intruders." This response led to a double crisis of "fight and flight,"
with white violence and then white escape to suburbia, leaving a decaying
city behind for an impoverished black population.
92. Id. at 363.
93. Id. at 218-19. Sugrue also quotes white homeowners arguing that white veterans earned the
right to exclude blacks from their neighborhoods. Id. at 79. Fighting in the war solidified their right to
keep what you have, not to open opportunities to others.
94. Id. at 212.
95. Id. at 226.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 219.
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Both Primus and Dudziak note that southern opposition borrowed anti-
totalitarian rhetoric from time to time. Primus grants that the 1948
Dixiecrat platform condemned Truman's civil rights policies as
"totalitarian government,"98  and that segregationists compared
Eisenhower's federal troops in Little Rock to Hitler's storm troopers.
Some conservatives called the 1964 Civil Rights Act "an outrage
belonging in Russia," and championed their resistance as a "continuous
struggle against totalitarianism."99 Dudziak also points to some of these
incidents, including their Cold War rhetoric. 00 However, both Primus and
Dudziak treat these episodes as isolated voices of protest, defeated by
more powerful historical forces-anti-totalitarianism and the Cold War
imperative. These voices of dissent may have failed to defeat the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, but it is crucial to understand how they framed that
debate and eventually prevailed. By relentlessly equating the Civil Rights
Act with communism and fascism,01 conservative leaders were able to lay
a foundation for a successful political counter-attack in 1968.
Unfortunately, Primus ignores the rights counter-revolution and its anti-
totalitarian language. Dudziak at least discusses the backlash and the end
of the civil rights era, but she does not mention their reactionary rights
rhetoric, despite how much this rhetoric often relied upon the Cold War.
She attributes the downfall of the civil rights movement to Vietnam and
Nixon's "law and order" anti-rights campaign, in response to race riots
and a more radical turn in the movement. However, if hers is a study of
how leaders articulated the Cold War imperative, she should have
investigated how the right wing successfully used the Cold War to frame
its rights claims and its opposition to centralized government.
The Republican party returned to power by reversing the roles of
populism and paternalism. The New Deal Democrats had come to power
on populism, but the Republicans gradually chipped into the New Deal
coalition by portraying the Democrats as out-of-touch patricians, elites,
bureaucrats, and technocrats. This strategy led Nixon to victory, and it has
been the foundation for the conservative successes over the last three
decades. Interestingly, this populism contains strains of anti-rights
backlash and rights talk. On the one hand, conservative populism rejects
minority rights claims and judicial activism as anti-democratic. On the
98. PRIMUS, supra note 2, at 213
99. Id. at 189.
100. DUDZIAK, supra note 3, at 136.
101. Conservative representatives and commentators argued that the Civil Rights Act was the
product of a Communist conspiracy to foment revolution, that it would lead to a "police state," an
"ant-hill society," and a Socialist take-over, that it would result in "involuntary servitude," and that it
would even lead to the rise of another Hitler or Stalin. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal
Protection by Law: Federal Anti-Discrimination Law After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441,
492-93 & nn.243-47 (2000).
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other hand, these conservatives use a language of rights to reject the
government's violations of property rights, religious freedom, and
freedom of association. Today, the "movement conservatives" continue to
speak their own language of rights: states' rights; the right to life; victims'
rights; the right to bear arms; free exercise of religion; and of course, free
market ideology and the freedoms of property and contract. These claims
are often as detached from constitutional texts (especially in the recent
explosion of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity) as the liberal
activist rulings that these conservatives decry.
III. CONCLUSION
These other historical inquiries confirm some of the most important
insights in The American Language of Rights and Cold War Civil Rights.
They demonstrate that Primus's theory of "concrete negation" operated in
different ways throughout American society, but with varying outcomes.
Totalitarianism and the Cold War served both as a mirror, in which
Americans identified certain parallel evils and dangers at home, and as a
prism, refracting the prior political commitments of liberal and
conservatives, elites and non-elites, to produce a spectrum of newly
framed commitments enshrined in rights discourse. In demonstrating the
influence of international affairs on American law, Primus and Dudziak
encourage the American legal academy to broaden its horizons and its
scholarly jurisdictions.
While they both deserve credit for providing this broader perspective,
their lack of breadth in domestic politics, particularly in overlooking the
conservatives' rights counter-revolution, is a shared shortcoming.
However, their concentration on particular events and sources allows them
to write more clearly about complicated legal transformations. This focus
on ideology, rhetoric, and political strategy also generates provocative
insights into American politics and a remarkable coherence about the
origins of our modem legal order.
But recalling how the Democrats lost their majority by becoming too
closely identified with elite liberal politics, 102 legal historians should try
not to make a similar mistake. 10 3 While certain studies demand a focus on
particular groups or particular political leanings, legal historians should
102. Rieder, supra note 6.
103. As Roberto Unger observed, "In moments when progressive lawyers have despaired of the
possibilities of popular politics or feared its dangers, and found the doors of the political branches of
government closed, they have been especially tempted to see in politics through judges the
providential surrogate for politics through politics. They have been regularly disappointed." ROBERTO
MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 83 (1996). The same may be true
for progressive legal academics.
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aspire to balance. Dudziak strikes a better balance than Primus, but both
could have engaged the rights counter-revolution. Such an inquiry would
have powerfully confirmed their larger arguments about foreign affairs,
"concrete negation," national self-reflection, and legal change.
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